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ABSTRACT  
 
 Cohen-Almagor's book represents a remarkable contribution to the discussion of the right to die 
with dignity. It offers the discussion of a wide range of topics. They include: the terminology 
respectful of human dignity (where, for example, 'post-coma unawareness' is suggested instead of 
'permanent vegetative state'); the question of autonomy; the sanctity-of life – quality of life debate; 
criticism of some extreme quality-of-life position; criticism of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between 
critical and experiential interests and the consequences this author draws from it; active and passive 
euthanasia; the Dutch experience and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; and many others. The 
book is discussed from a basically sympathetic view, where some details are focused on as meriting 
some further examination. Some remarks are offered to indicate the complexity of the definition of 
autonomy; a defense  of Dworkin's argument is offered; an insistence on the necessity to rely on 
moral conferring features is remarked. 
 
 
 
1. Raphael Cohen-Almagor offers us a really comprehensive, rich of background 
information and critically considered discussion about questions of death and the choice 
of death in the context of the medical practice (1). His book includes several chapters on 
the topic, and I will discuss some of them. I am very much sympathetic with most of 
Cohen-Almagor's argumentation. However, I leave to a direct reading the possibility to 
appreciate in details most of the numerous virtues of the book. Here I address those 
parts of the book that, in my opinion, deserve some further discussion. I think that this is 
the best way to express the richness and the wide range of virtues exemplified in this 
book.  
In the Introduction, Cohen-Almagor ponders the most general terms of the debate 
between those that hold the sanctity of life principle and those that hold the principle of 
autonomy as inspiring and shaping the discussion on the right to die. Supporters of 
sanctity of life find human life as inviolable, and do not accept reasons to terminate it. 
Supporters of the autonomy-based approach allow the interested subjects to decide 
about whether life has still any meaning for them. This implies (with some qualifications, 
as we will see later) the right to choose death.  
Now, I think we can fairly be satisfied with the definition of the sanctity of life doctrine, 
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which is, by itself, put in very clear terms. There is still a problem with the rival 
doctrine. What is exactly 'autonomy', that that is to be respected? Cohen-Almagor says 
the following: «Choosing the best option or thinking correctly is not a requirement for 
autonomy so long as we assess the alternatives carefully. The emphasis is not on 
deciding on the best options or on holding true opinions, but rather on the way in which 
we come to hold our convictions and make our decisions» (2). The crucial thing for 
autonomy is the possibility that an individual has to reflect about her own beliefs and 
ideas, as well as the ability to form ideas about them, in order to decide how to live. In 
order to make choices we need a range of options to choose.  
This is the conception of autonomy frequently adopted by liberals, like Cohen-Almagor. 
Although this is not very usual in books on bioethics, it seems to me that the concept of 
autonomy deserves a little more theoretical and analytical specification. It may be useful, 
for example, to distinguish this concept from that of Immanuel Kant, in order to specify 
the superiority of the present concept (3). According to Kant, autonomy is the property 
of an agent who makes decisions according to pure practical reason, and acts according 
to the unconditioned duty. If the subject acts by following her natural inclinations, she is 
not autonomous. A consequence of this, according to Kant, is that if the subject chooses 
death in order to avoid pain, she follows a natural inclination and is not autonomous. 
This is obviously not the case if one follows the concept of autonomy endorsed by 
Cohen-Almagor. In his case, it is enough that the individual considers the different 
options and chooses for one of them. If the subject reflectively evaluates that her life, 
perhaps due to strong pain, is not any more valuable, or does not find any more 
meaning in it, then she is allowed to choose death. But this may be exactly the choice to 
surrender to a natural inclination, i.e. of heteronomy and not of autonomy, as a Kantian 
would say. As it is known, there are influential Kantian arguments against suicide that 
rely on this complex interpretation of autonomy, and these arguments, although 
reformulated, are used in contemporary debates, as well (4). 
Another point may be this one. An individual can be in the position of not having ever 
thought about diverse opportunities in her life. She was raised in a conservative 
community, and she acknowledged only one moral outlook in her life. It seems to me 
that there may be a sense in which we can say that there is some practical necessity in 
what she does. There are no really available opportunities to her, because she has never 
had a real opportunity to reflect about different options. Is her choice autonomous? If 
not, does she deserve the right to choose in matters of death? Intuitively, it does not 
seem to me that she deserves this right less than an individual raised in a multicultural 
community, distinguished by multicultural education. But, the second individual satisfies 
Cohen-Almagor's definition of autonomy, while the first does not. At least, this seems to 
me.  
These are obviously questions at a rather abstract theoretical level, and I do not find as 
crucially relevant, in a book on the right to dignity which has strong applicative interests, 
the absence of the more detailed discussion of the questions that I have raised. In his 
background discussion, the author reflects on prominent philosophers in the liberal 
tradition, like John Rawls and Joseph Raz.  
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2. Cohen-Almagor shows concern for the correct way of language usage, in a way that it 
is not damaging the patients' interests. He opposes the usage of the expressions 
'terminal' and 'persistent vegetative state'. Instead of 'persistent vegetative state', 
Cohen-Almagor proposes 'prolonged unawareness' and 'post-coma unawareness'. The 
term 'coma' is limited to cases where three elements are present: closed eyes, no 
utterances of meaningful sounds, and no adequate motor reaction to external stimuli. 
The terms suggested by Cohen-Almagor are intended to be mere technical terms that 
need to substitute the term 'vegetative' which dehumanizes patients, and is offensive to 
their dignity, as well as to the dignity of their loved ones. Cohen-Almagor finds a 
connection between the use of the term 'vegetative state' to the term vegetable, which is 
ethically impermissible. An equivalent way of thinking is developed by Cohen-Almagor 
in relation to the expression 'terminal'. This term suggests a picture in which the 
medical staff is only waiting for the death of the patient, while, on the other hand, 
human life deserves full respect and care until the last moment.  
This part of Cohen-Almagor's book is interesting from various standpoints. One of them 
that is surely remarkable is the indication that authors that accept the right to choose in 
matters of death are not, by this same fact, expressing a loss of respect, or consideration 
for human life. Cohen-Almagor considers with great balance the respective weight of the 
value of autonomy, as well as that of human life in general. This is one of the greatest 
merits of the book.  
When discussing post-coma unawareness patients (a condition that comprises reversible 
damages of the brain cerebrum, that is the possibility of a way back to a meaningful life 
and which must be distinguished from brain death), Cohen-Almagor indicates that it is 
not acceptable to take as a normal clinical practice to deny forms of care to them. In the 
case of brain death (which includes the death of the brain stem), there are irreversible 
damages that do not permit to return to a meaningful life. Cohen-Almagor urges 
hospitals as a policy not to cease treatment of post-traumatic post-coma unawareness 
patients younger than 50 years old within a period of less than two years. The two-year 
waiting period should be regarded as the minimum period of evaluation before forgoing 
hopes for patients’ rehabilitation and return to some form of cognition. The study 
provides data and human stories from the Israeli experience as well as from England, 
Canada, the United States and other countries to substantiate this argument. 
 
3. In the third chapter Cohen-Almagor considers the debate between the sanctity of life 
doctrine and the quality of life doctrine. The former attributes value and absolute 
protection to human life as such. The latter considers the content of life, as the value-
attributing feature. I will show in some details Cohen-Almagor's criticism of some 
exemplifications of the quality of life doctrine, in particular, those of Helga Kuhse and 
Peter Singer. In their opinion, life can be evaluated, so that, for example, the life of a 
mature, autonomous, and healthy person is more valuable than that of an anencephalic 
infant. Kuhse and Singer refute the criterion of evaluation of life that refers to species 
belonging. What matter are value-conferring features, like those indicated above.  
Cohen-Almagor opposes this view. According to him, «What makes people worthy of 
respect is their humanness, the fact that people are people, whether or not they have a 
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capacity for self-determination, adoption of ideals, or a sense of the future. When human 
life begins, it is important that it will continue with dignity and with respect. We give 
people respect because we value life as such, in itself» (5). This is not to take a stance 
for the denial of physician-assisted suicide. It may happen that life becomes for us so 
painful that we choose death as a better option.  
Cohen-Almagor finds Kuhse's and Singer's position incoherent. On the one hand, they 
do not attribute full protection to the life of infants (in virtue of the absence of actual 
value-conferring features); on the other hand, they require that society engages in 
allocation of resources for disabled people. In fact, they qualify their statement related to 
the protection of children. They say that they are denying full protection only to the life 
of disabled infants. This, according to them, permits to allocate resources so that adult 
disabled people are helped in a better way.  
Cohen-Almagor thinks that the adoption of Kuhse's and Singer's proposal originates 
dangerous social consequences. One of them is the irresponsibility of the parents who 
may too easily adopt infanticide. Or, mothers can be irresponsible in their pregnancy, 
not renouncing to elements in their life that may be dangerous for the future person, in 
virtue of the fact that they may make use of infanticide if something goes wrong.  
Cohen-Almagor declares himself as a speciesist, and he cares first of all about our own 
species, us human beings. He thinks that newborn infants have a right to life, merely in 
virtue of the fact that they are human. According to him, there is nothing worrying in 
this, and he says «it is only a human and preferable inclination to think first about our 
fellow humans. It is also natural for an elephant to think first and foremost about its 
fellow elephants» (6). Cohen-Almagor opposes some very radical Singer's stances, for 
example, that the killing of a chimpanzee is a more serious act than the killing of a 
human being with intellectual defects. Moreover, Cohen-Almagor thinks that there is a 
mistake in Singer's proposal when he attributes no moral weight to the killing of a 
human life deprived of intellectual capacity. The mistake is due to the fact that this life 
can, nevertheless, be evaluated as deserving dignity by other people in virtue of, for 
example, love of family members, or religious reasons.  
This is the part of Cohen-Almagor's book that I find most questionable. Let's start from 
the last part. It is true that there is something disturbing in the  terminology in the 
description Singer gives to his theory. However, it seems to me that some aspects of 
Cohen-Almagor's criticism of Singer's stance are overstated. First, it seems to me that 
Singer does not exclude the possibility that some lives may have to be respected even 
when losing the value conferring feature. Singer explicitly says that a life may deserve 
protection in virtue of the fact that some people may attribute value to it. When, in his 
Practical Ethics, he says that newborn infants do not possess value conferring features, 
he adds that there is a difference between newborn infants with serious defects, and 
healthy newborn infants. In the second case, we have an event that is a happy event for 
people in full possession of rights (7). We can see, surely, an important omission, in 
Singer's explanation of his theory. This is the exclusive statement that only the life of a 
healthy infant can represent a joyful event for the parents. However, there is something 
relevant, and its presence in Singer's thought deserves to be remarked, contrary to what 
Cohen-Almagor does. It is the fact that value can be attributed indirectly to some beings. 
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The indirect way is the value attributed by people in full possession of a moral status. 
But if this is permitted, then the consideration of some people for some beings may 
represent a reason to attribute value to all newborn infants, and to all human beings, 
independently of the fact whether they are defective or not. It seems to me that Singer's 
rhetoric is directed toward those people who do not want to permit cases of euthanasia 
absolutely, like the defenders of the sanctity of life doctrine. But, it would be quite 
incoherent with what he says to interpret that euthanasia becomes something that can be 
imposed on parents that do not want it, or that it is legitimate to declare a life as fully 
losing value despite the attitude of the parents, as it may appear from Cohen-Almagor's 
criticism of Singer.  
Second, it seems to me that there is not such a plain contradiction in engaging for the 
euthanasia of defective newborn infants (when it corresponds to the wish of the parents), 
and the statement that this is (also) in order to help in a better way defective adults. This 
discussion reminds that regarding prenatal screening, opposed by people who fear that 
this practice may create a presumption contrary to disabled people. Philip Kitcher 
convincingly shows that this is mistaken attitude (8). He indicates examples of situations 
where programs directed toward the reduction of the incidence of genetic disabilities 
come together with an increasing of the support for disabled people already born. If this 
is true, I do not see any serious reason to deny that the permission of euthanasia 
(provided the consent of the parents) in the case of newborn defective infants can come 
together with the sustain of a program of support for adult disabled people.  
In relation to a kind of slippery-slope argument that Cohen-Almagor offers, according to 
which parents may come too easily to adopt infanticide, or, mothers may behave 
irresponsibly during their pregnancy, in virtue of the fact that they may make use of 
infanticide if something goes wrong, I must say that I do not find the arguments really 
convincing. It appears to me that most of the people have a strong emotional attitude 
toward their children, and that infanticide can be only a last resort in desperate cases, as 
far as we know about radical features in human behavior. In any case, if the attitude 
changes becoming a worrying social occurrence, it is possible to change the rules when 
this becomes a clear and present danger. As for the possibility of increasing the 
irresponsibility of the pregnant woman, I do not see any reason why the permission of 
infanticide would have any effect on this attitude, more than this is done by abortion.  
I do not find Cohen-Almagor's declaration for speciesism convincing as well. I think that 
there are reasons to privilege our fellow members of our species, but the reason cannot 
be the simple appeal to the naturalness of this. I guess that it is a wide shared attitude to 
evaluate with particular strength humanity as related to the possibility of critical moral 
thinking. But if this is true, we cannot embrace a behavior simply because it is followed 
by other animals, that act only instinctively. This would be to renounce to a relevant 
aspect of humanity. A moral attitude is adopted in a way respectful of humanity only 
reflectively. But it appears too limited a reflection that appeals to a similarity of an 
attitude with that shared by animals not capable of critical thinking.  
However, I must say that I do not embrace Singer's and Kuhse's version of the quality 
of life doctrine, and I think that valid arguments can be offered against it. This is the 
reason why, although I am not very much convinced by Cohen-Almagor's criticism of 
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these authors, I am, nevertheless, very much in sympathy with his proposal for only 
limited legitimation of quality-of-life considerations in the evaluation about whether it is 
morally appropriate to end a life.  
Cohen-Almagor does not refute all possible kinds of consideration of quality of life. 
Although there is a sense in the preservation of life, this is not absolute. «The Kantian 
view that conceives of people as ends rather than means leads to the conclusion that life 
is not sanctified when the continuation of life harms human dignity and contradicts the 
patient's best interest» (9). The concept of quality of life is subjective, and the crucial 
question is about the will of the patient. However, there are three fundamental elements 
in determining quality of life, i.e. consciousness, lack of suffering, and dignity. The 
relative importance of each of them depends on single patients. Considerations of quality 
of life have implications in various directions: the financial aspects, the doctor-patients 
relationship, relationships with the surroundings, the effects on the patients themselves.  
 
4. As usual in the discussions about the right to dignity, Cohen-Almagor discusses active 
and passive euthanasia. Some authors find this distinction relevant, in particular in 
virtue of the moral significance of the difference between killing and letting die. Cohen-
Almagor thinks that the will of the patients to die with dignity (in the way they find 
dignified) deserves serious consideration. «Medicine and ethics should address their 
needs. Although this is not an easy task, the solution must not be beyond our reach, 
either medically or ethically. That solution might change the nature of medicine, but the 
nature of medicine is not a static concept» (10). However, Cohen-Almagor does not 
advocate active euthanasia but rather physician-assisted suicide, in virtue of possible 
abuses.  
There is one specific case when Cohen-Almagor opposes active euthanasia with a 
particular motivation, and this is in the discussion with Ronald Dworkin (11). Dworkin 
distinguishes between experiential interests and critical interests. The former are related 
to a subject who is aware of what happens to her, and wants to find pleasure in the 
fulfillment of her desires. The latter are related to the accomplishment of a worthwhile 
life. Dworkin thinks that critical interests render human life valuable, and, therefore, it is 
their satisfaction and protection that matters. Related to the question of the present 
discussion, Dworkin says that many people do not want to be remembered for the part 
of their life that they found degrading. The most interesting and controversial part of the 
discussion regards cases of Alzheimer's disease. Dworkin compares the part of the life of 
the subject that has expressed some wishes when she was able to do this, in particular 
wishes not to live in a situation like that included in the Alzheimer's disease, and the life 
in that condition. In the former case, we have critical interests of the subject (the 
accomplishment of a life plan), in the latter only experiential interests (like avoiding 
pain, or that of getting a piece of bread with butter). In Dworkin's opinion, there is 
nothing valuable by itself in the latter case, and this is the reason why the wish 
expressed by the subject in the former condition has to be respected.  
Cohen-Almagor criticizes this proposal. He thinks that life can be valuable even in the 
case of an advanced condition of Alzheimer's disease. Moreover, he says that the 
present desires of the subject have to prevail on those formulated earlier. The crucial 
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argument is that it is not true that our directives are predetermined and unchangeable, 
and we are not able to know how our lives will look in front of death. Cohen-Almagor 
thinks that the notion of unchangeable and unified personality is questionable. «Indeed, 
the very idea of autonomy reflects our ability and desire to construct and reshape 
realities, to reevaluate values and ideas, to renounce to old beliefs, and to accommodate 
ourselves to new situations» (12). In particular, Cohen-Almagor questions Dworkin's 
statement that human beings, as rational agents, can establish in advance what will be 
their preference. On the contrary, Cohen-Almagor thinks that human beings are not only 
thinking creatures. People sometimes act, or are pushed to act, on the ground of their 
sentiments, instincts, impulses, and, in general, by factors that it is difficult to explain 
rationally. All this opens the question whether advanced directives are invalid when the 
patient is incompetent. «It is usually assumed that the justification for giving the 
competent person power over decisions to be made in the future, when he or she is 
incompetent, is that the competent person is best situated to identify what those future 
interests will be. The problem, however, is that the incompetent patient's interests are no 
longer informed by the interests and values he or she had when competent» (13). 
Cohen-Almagor's solution is now quite different from Dworkin's. Dworkin says that it is 
respectful of the human being to show full consideration for her advanced directives, 
because they are related to her exercise of autonomy. Cohen-Almagor thinks that no 
such mechanical attitude may be taken. «Doctors, family, and others involved in the care 
of incompetent patients should be able to examine whether patient interests would best 
be served by actions contrary to the living will, in situations in which the incompetent 
patient appears to have an interest in further life» (14). In brief, by using Dworkin's 
terminology, Cohen-Almagor says that the experiential interests in the present are more 
important than critical interests voiced in the past. «What may seem experiential in one 
stage of life might in a marred, limited life become critical to our being. For some 
demented patients the taste of vanilla ice cream and the smell of lilies might be essential 
to the definition and conception of life» (15). 
I find questionable this part of Cohen-Almagor's discussion, and the reasons for my 
worry are the same as those I indicated when debating the question of speciesism. 
Cohen-Almagor attributes high moral consideration to human life as such. This is the 
reason why he finds that all moments of human life deserve equal consideration. On the 
other hand, the same as, I think, is Dworkin's opinion, it seems to me that some criteria 
and distinctions have to be established. In my opinion there are specific value-conferring 
and right-conferring features of human beings that are crucial in establishing our moral 
status. These are, primarily, the capacity to be rational and reasonable (in Rawls's 
terminology) (16). This does not mean that human life has not value in some conditions, 
but it does mean that some considerations of moral priority may be put forward, and 
these considerations are different from Cohen-Almagor's, while they are apt to support 
Dworkin's view.  
If it is rational and reasonable capacities that are the primary value-conferring features 
to human beings, the will of the human being, while she was able to formulate her life 
plan, has priority over other considerations. The life condition that comes after the 
person has lost cognitive capacities deserves moral respect, but primarily in virtue of the 
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human being that was owner of a high moral status. In the case of conflict, the most 
pressing considerations are overriding. In the specific case, this is the respect of the will 
of the person when she was able, as a reasonable and rational person, to formulate a life 
plan, and she did this. More precisely, in the case of the Alzheimer, the will of the 
person in the full possession of her mental capacities must be respected. It is true, as 
Cohen-Almagor says, that a life plan is not unchangeable. However, a life plan is 
changeable if the person is still able to formulate, or rethink about it. When a subject 
loses the capacity to be rational and reasonable, she does not have any more a life plan, 
and cannot reformulate it. Her life plan comes to the end, and the relevant problem is, 
as Dworkin says, the way this end will look like. The dilemma is whether the end will 
look like the person wanted, or in another way. It is true, as well, that there are life 
conditions when a person finds as valuable things that she even did not consider as 
relevant earlier. I can speak about my personal experience in a case that is banal as 
compared to the dramatic situations discussed here. When I was in the army and, for 
weeks, had the possibility to eat only the (rather disgusting) food we had, I found a 
pleasure, and a value, in vanilla ice in a way that I never imagined earlier. Here I agree 
with Cohen-Almagor. There are life situations when we reshape our life plan, because 
the conditions are new, and previously even not imaginable. However, I am ready to 
agree with this if we are speaking of someone who is still a rational and reasonable 
person. In the other case, I would disagree with the attitude of attributing a life plan to a 
subject. In particular, I do not find convincing Cohen-Almagor's statement that «What 
may seem experiential in one stage of life might in a marred, limited life become critical 
to our being. For some demented patients the taste of vanilla ice cream and the smell of 
lilies might be essential to the definition and conception of life». Unfortunately, in the 
stage of life we are discussing, nothing has the possibility to become critical, and there 
is, unfortunately, no more definition and conception of life. There is exactly what is 
indicated by Dworkin, the presence of experiential interests. Otherwise, it would be 
required to attribute a definition and conception of life to other animals with similar 
cognitive capacities, which is, I think, unconvincing. This is not enough to say that 
human life, in any stage, may become morally comparable to the life of other animals. 
As I said, I think there are reasons to attribute a special concern for human life, anyway. 
However, there is a privilege for the will expressed in some moments of life, in 
comparison to desires existing in another moment of life. This is the case of moral 
dilemma, and, like in every situation of moral dilemma, the choice is tragic.  
 
5. One of the great merits of Cohen-Almagor's book is the verification of euthanasia in 
practical life. In order to possess direct evidence, Cohen-Almagor investigated the Dutch 
situation. He found there a set of troublesome results. Although there is a wide 
agreement on the acceptability of euthanasia, people do not seem to endorse the practice 
with the required reflectivity. Cohen-Almagor found that it is not always the patient who 
makes the requirement for euthanasia. Sometimes, doctors propose it, and sometimes 
the family initiates the request. On some occasions, there were no requests, and patients 
were put to death. In other cases, patients' requests were not durable and persistent as 
they need to be. The guidelines indicate a term too open to interpretation, like 
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unbearable suffering. Another reason for worrying is the large amount of unreported 
cases of euthanasia. All these troublesome aspects suggest to Cohen-Almagor a cautious 
attitude toward euthanasia. His answer is the proposal to restrict, as far as possible, the 
choice to die to the practice of physician-assisted suicide, that gives patients control over 
their lives until the last moment, and provides a further mechanism against abuses. 
Cohen-Almagor is ready to concede euthanasia just in two cases: « (1) the patient who 
asked the euthanasia is totally paralyzed, from head to toe, unable to move any muscles 
that could facilitate assisted suicide; (2) the patient took oral medication and the dying 
process is lasting for many ours» (17). 
Cohen-Almagor's contribution to this part of discussion is extremely relevant, and I do 
not know of any other author who shows such a conscientious approach to the problem. 
The direct inquiry in Netherlands is precious. However, perhaps a comparative analysis 
may be useful. Kuhse provides comparative data between Netherlands and Australia. 
According to her data 3.5% of death in Australia (1996)  are caused by lethal 
medication without the request of the patient, while in Netherlands (1995) this is 0.7%, 
less than in Australia. In Australia 22.5% of deaths are due to the withdrawal of 
treatment without the request of the patient, while in Netherlands the total amount of 
deaths due to withdrawal is 12.5% (18). 
This, obviously, is not a reason to suspend caution in Netherlands, and not a refutation 
of Cohen-Almagor's conclusion related to the suspicion about euthanasia, and privileging 
physician-assisted suicide. Perhaps, this is the most reasonable attitude. However, the 
data indicated by Kuhse may suggest that a less restrictive, but regulated situation, is 
preferable to a more restrictive situation, because this one may represent a suitable 
ground for practices left to behavior less respectful of patient's will.  
There is some continuity between the discussion of the Netherlands's case, and the 
discussion of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. This is the other chapter that Cohen-
Almagor dedicates to the practical verification of the regulation of choosing death. I will 
not discuss this chapter in detail, although I think that some parts of it are of notable 
relevance. First of all, there is the interesting consideration that speaks against some 
worries related to physician-assisted suicide. For example, the third report of the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act indicates that twenty-seven patients have chosen death, where 
«fifteen of them were women; twelve men. Patients with a college education were more 
likely to choose physician-assisted suicide than those without a high-school education; 
patients with post baccalaureate education were more likely to choose physician-assisted 
suicide» (19). It seems that these data refute some fears that the permission of physician-
assisted suicide will represent a danger for the discriminated population (20). The 
number of women that have chosen physician-assisted suicide is just a little higher than 
that of the men, while people of higher level education are more apt to choose this 
practice. Furthermore, the prominent consideration for the choice of physician-assisted 
suicide is the fear to lose autonomy, the decreased ability to participate in enjoyable 
activities, loss of the control of bodily functions, and being a burden to the loved ones. 
Although we must interpret this data with due caution, this seems to refute the attitude 
of those who think that adequate reduction of pain is a valid substitute for physician-
assisted suicide.  
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6. In the remaining part of the book, Cohen-Almagor goes to his conclusions, where, 
among else, he offers some remarkable guidelines for a successful application of the 
dignified death policy. In the Appendix he offers a discussion about allocation of 
resources.  
Cohen-Almagor's book is a complete, interdisciplinary discussion of the question of the 
right to die with dignity. It may be of great interest to people coming from different 
experiences. Its language, and the methodology adopted by the author, makes possible 
to read it for a wide range of potential readers. An exceptional merit of the book is that 
it provides a balanced view that never renounces to pay due attention to human life, as 
well as to human dignity. 
 
Note. 
 
(1) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity. An Argument in Ethics, Medicine 
and Law, New Brunswick and London, Rutgers University Press, 2001. 
(2) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 2. 
(3) I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785, 
http://ethics.acusd.edu.texts/Kant/MM/Part2.html . 
(4) J. David Velleman, A Right to Self-Termination?, “Ethics”, 1999. Cohen-Almagor i 
fact appeals to Kant’s concept of autonomy (pp. 3-4), but does not seem to face fully the 
specific meaning that this author attributes to “autonomy”. 
(5) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 68. 
(6) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 70. 
(7) P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, 32. 
(8) P. Kitcher, The Lives to Come. The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities, New 
York, Touchstone, 1996, 85, 236-238.  
(9) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 72. 
(10) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 84. 
(11) R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and 
Individual Freedom, New York, Alfred A. Kopf, 1993. 
(12) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 100. 
(13) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 103. 
(14) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 103. 
(15) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 111. 
(16) J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, 48-54. 
(17) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 157. 
(18) H. Kuhse, From Intention to Consent, in Battin, M.P., Rhodes, R. e Silvers A. (ed. 
by), Physician Assisted Suicide. Expanding the Debate, London, Routledge, 1998, 65-
75. 
(19) R. Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 171. 
(20) This fear is expressed in relation to the African-American community in P. A. King, 
L. A. Wolf, Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African-American Experience, 
in Battin, M. P., Rhodes, R. e Silvers A. (ed. by), Physician Assisted Suicide. Expanding 
 10
 11
the Debate, cit., pp. 91-112. The argument can, obviously, be extended to any other 
traditionally discriminated community.  
 
